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IS THE "DUBAI MODEL" A NEW PARADIGM FOR GROWTH AND 
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR OIL-BASED ECONOMIES? 
CASE STUDY EURASIA 
INTRODUCTION 
Inward and outward investment flow patterns of Middle East oil-rich economies are 
beginning to shift as governments are feeling a renewed sense of urgency in trying to 
reverse decades of economic and related social failure (Askari & Jaber, 1999). Oil 
depletion coupled with low savings and non-productive investments yielding little 
economic diversification has resulted in no real establishment of global or regional 
comparative advantage in sectors other than oil and gas (Sala-i-Martin & Artadi, 2003). 
This is particularly true of the oil-rich Persian Gulf economies. 1 
More recently, non-traditional growth strategies are being employed in the Middle 
East, especially in some Persian Gulf countries, for example the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE).2 They are non traditional in the regional sense and not the economic sense, i.e. 
foreign ownership of private property, repatriation of capital. These countries are 
beginning to demonstrate a unique economic vision that attempts to diversifY their 
economy and establish global competitive advantage.3 The UAE in general, and Dubai in 
particular, have gone to great lengths and expense in an effort to develop international 
trade and finance free zones, allowing foreign ownership of private property, focusing on 
higher education for both men and women, and encouraging foreign private capital to 
invest via both FDI and portfolio capital with controlling interests (over 51% ownership; 
World Bank, 2000). Some might argue that this strategy is late and still somewhat 
haphazardly being implemented, and the country's results on innovation and R&D (Arab 
Competitiveness Report, 2007) call for public and private investments. The UAE, 
nonetheless, is leading the regional pack in terms of creating sustainable comparative 
advantage and sustainable economic growth for themselves using non-traditional 
techniques.4 Their end objective being a steady stream of private capital flowing5 into the 
UAE's targeted sectors6 to sustain a reasonably high living standard well after their oil 
1 The Arab World Competitiveness Report 2007, World Economic Forum 
http://www. wefornm.org/pdf/G lobal Competitiveness Reports/Reports/chapterone.pdf 
2 Fasano, U. With open economy and sound policies, U.A.E. has turned oil "curse" into a blessing. IMF 
Survey: 31 (19) http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/200211 021 02.pdf 
3 Fasano, U., Iqbal, Z. 2003. GCC Countries: From Oil Dependence to Diversification. IMF 
http://www.imf.org/externaVpubs/ft/med/2003/eng/fasano/index.htm#S 
4 Non-oil growth has averaged 10.6% annually over the past five years, the fastest expansion in the Gulf 
region, according to the IMF database. 
htto:/ /www. imf. org/externaVpubs/ft/reo/2007 /mcd/eng/mreo I 007 .pdf 
5 Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: What needs to be done? Dubai Strategy Forum 
http:/ /www.dubaistrategy.com/program(b I ).htrn 
6 110ld and New" sectors. The former includes petroleum, oil refining, petrochemicals, fertilisers, 
construction, steel and aluminium industries, whilst the latter includes information communications and 
technology (ICT), media, tourism, aviation, portfolio asset management and health care, among others." 
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and gas reserves are depleted and no longer serve as the lure to foreign private 
investment. We refer to this non-traditional growth strategy as the "Dubai ModeL"7 
'Dubai Model's essential tenant is that "build it and they will come." The model has 
some basic characteristics and objectives. The goal is to rapidly develop specific non-oil 
sectors and attract sustainable foreign investment. This is currently being achieved by 
pouring massive quantities of money at the problems that were created by 30 plus years 
of economic mismanagement. This is done by massive amounts of physical construction 
and the use of name branding to get an instant credibility for targeted industries. 
Examples of such projects are artificial islands in a form of Palm Island, and Dubai 
World, the indoor ski resort Dubai Ski Dome, immense sport complex of Dubai Sports 
City as a part of the Dubailand, the world's first underwater luxury resort Hydropolis, the 
world's first built-on-purpose Maritime City intended to integrate the maritime industry. 
Among others are Dubai Healthcare City combining hospital, medical school and life 
science research center in a partnership with Harvard Medical School and Boston 
University Institute for Dental Research and Education, London's Moorfields Eye 
Hospital; Dubai Internet, Studio, Media, Textile Cities with free trade zones and I 00% 
company ownership aimed to boost production in these industries. 8 The ultimate 
objective is to attract vast amounts of sustainable inflow of private capital in the non-oil 
related sector- so that sustainable growth, productivity and revenue will remain once the 
oil (and gas) runs out. It should be noted that historically, most investment inflow has 
been oil sector/petroindustry related. To date, Dubai has been quite successful in 
attracting non-oil related foreign investments with construction industry 34,5%, and 
financial intermediation and insurance 35,38% being the main recipients ofFDI in 2006.9 
Non-oil sector keeps significantly contributing to the growth of the country. 
TFP=Total facwr productivity; JCddle capaciry• 
Source: Dubai Chambel0 
We find that many oil-rich countries in the Persian Gulf region are now seeing the 
merit of this approach and attempting to adopt the elements of the "Dubai Model" of 
sustainable economic growth i.e. growth through private investment into the R&D driven 
sectors after oil has been depleted 11 . Qatar, for example, has made its move to become a 
7 © Copyright 2008, Scheherazade S. Rehman. 
8 http://www .projectdubai.com/projects.php?pri id= 3 7 &areas= all 
9 Dubai Statistics Center Bulletin "'Foreign Direct Investment- Dubai Emirate 2007''. 
htto://www.dm.gov.ae/Porta1Resources/DMEGOV/OSI/webreports/FDI07Eng.pdf 
10 http:/ /www.dcci.gov.ae/content/Bulletin/Issue 19/SectorMonEn ISSUE 19. pdf 
11 See Wells (2005) http://www.btintemet.com/-nlpWESSEX/Documents/OGJoumaiEnergyCrisis.htm 
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regional hub of higher education. Others, like Saudi Arabia, who have languished 
rudderless in terms of a planned economic growth and diversification strategy for almost 
30 years are suddenly realizing their folly and are scrambling to introduce free trade and 
finance zones designed to compliment each other. Examples include financial, 
educational and medical research centers aimed to establish profound innovation 
infrastructure (i.e. by attracting highly recognizable brand names such as Harvard, John 
Hopkins, etc. to gain instant credibility and expertise). They are following an aggressive 
non-oil sector development program to globalize and integrate into the world economy. !2 
Hence, we now see a multitude of Saudi projects, for example, the Kingdom's bid to 
repatriate capital and attract value-added foreign investments into its Economic Cities 
through the so called "10 x 10" program to put Saudi Arabia among the world's top 10 
globally competitive investment destinations by 20 I 0.13 
More importantly these countries comprehend the need to diversify their economies 
(Auty, 1993; Eifert, Gelb & Tallroth, 2002; Rice & Mahmoud, 2000; Mehdi, 2004)14 and 
to ensure a stable source of funding for investment activities (Bisat et al., 1997) both via 
repatriation of capital and attraction of FDI15. The need for sustainable future foreign 
private investment outways the traditional fears associated with globalization of these 
economies. 16 This is especially true given the widely publicized bleak economic 
prospects of these economies if nothing is done, and done quickly. 17 These economies, 
for the first time, are attempting to either capitalize on or create their regional and 
sometimes global comparative advantage by attracting FDI into targeted sectors (other 
than oil and gas). For example, Saudi Arabia's efforts to capitalize on its unique global 
religious comparative advantage of the "Kaaba18" in building the Knowledge Economic 
City in Medina. The city tries to encompass multiple objectives from taking advantage of 
religion as a uniquely Saudi competitive advantage while encouraging globalization and 
economic development. 19 
The first part of the paper addresses the theoretical background of economic growth 
and competitive advantage models. Although there is a whole set of research on a 
relationship. between foreign direct investments and economic growth20, little has been 
12 IMF Survey Magazine: Countries&Regions, Non-Oil Sector Supports Saudi Growth, Koba Gvenetadze 
http://www. imf.org/externaVpubs/ft!survey/so/2007/CAR 1114 A.htm 
13 See Appendix 1. http://www.sagia.gov.sa/englishJindex.php?page=overview-of-lOxl 0-program 
14 See Al-Shamali and Denton (2000). Also, see IMF Survey Magazine: Countries & Regions, Sound 
Policies Behind Strong Growth, Elisa Diehl 
http://www.imf.org/externaVpubs/ft!survey/so/2007/CAR066A.htm 
15 Sluggish growth, declining oil reserves prompt Qatar to diversify economy away from oiL 
IMF Survey: 30(22): htto://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft!survey/2001/11260Lpdf 
16 See Yusuf(2001) for a prominent discussion of this topic. 
17 http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media!Oil Boom Gives Gulf Sovereigns Room.pdf 
18 See Appendix 2. 
19 The city will comprise various zones designed to compliment each other: a technology and knowledge 
based industry zone, an advanced IT studies institute, an interactive museum on the life of Prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH, a center for Islamic civilization studies), a campus for medical research and life 
sciences, an integrated medical services zone, a retail zone, a business district, residential zones including 
high rises, houses, and fully-serviced apartments, shopping malls, and a mosque with a I 0,000 worshipper 
capacity. 
2° Carcovic M., Levine, R. 2002. Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic Growth? 
Department of Business Finance, University of Minessota, Working paper Series. 
http ://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapters preview/381 0/08iie381 0. pdf 
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said on foreign direct investments and national competitive advantage with respect to 
economic growth of oil and gas abundant countries of Middle East and Central Asia. The 
second part of our paper introduces the framework of the so-called "Dubai Model" in 
detail and outlines the key components necessary to develop sustainable comparative 
advantage for the oil-rich economies. The third part proceeds with the methodology 
employed to measure the success of the "Dubai Model" in the UAE and in application to 
other regions. The last part brings the results and investigates the degree to which other 
oil and gas countries in the region (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran) have adopted 
the so-called "Dubai Model". It also examines if the Dubai Model is being employed in 
the Eurasian (Central Asian) oil and gas regions of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The objective is to gauge if the Eurasian economies are 
employing the traditional growth strategies of oil-rich non-OECD countries in managing 
their natural resources or are they adopting the newer non-traditional model of economic 
growth, such as the "Dubai Model." 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section we first look at the experience of Persian Gulf countries, and then follow 
with a current literature on economic growth, comparative advantage with a special focus 
on the natural abundant countries. 
Persian Gulf Experience 
A review of the economic development of the oil-rich countries in this region by Askari 
& Haber (1999) reveals that there has been no real comprehendible long-term economic 
growth strategy for most of these economies. Many of these countries conducted 
haphazard economic strategies over the last 30 years, which have yielded disastrous 
results. For example, failure to achieve significant economic diversification, rising 
joblessness amongst the youth, dropping standards of living, soaring goverrnnent 
budgets, low savings, shrinking of the middle class, and other economic and related 
social ills?1 Declining economic growth accompanied by quantitatively high investment 
rate in the Arab world within the last 30-40 years, observed by Sala-i-Martin & Artadi 
(2003) and Nili & Rastad (2007), suggests the low quality of investment projects to be 
the key determinant of growth in oil-exporting countries. According to these authors, the 
low quality of financial institutions, the excessive reliance on public investment, the 
dominant role of government in total investment, the weakness of private sector and the 
low quality of human capital determined systematically unproductive investment 
decisions and, thus, low economic growth. The issue of developing a sustainable 
While some authors would argue the unconditional positive impact of FDI on growth worldwide and in the 
Arab context (van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie & Lichtenberg, 2001; Krogstrup & Matar, 2005; Ledyaeva 
& Linden 2006), others (De Mello, 1997; Sadik & Bolbol, 2001; Saggi, 2000) bring the evidence ofFDI to 
be growth enhancing in the long-run if the conditions of technological progress and human capital 
accumulation are met. 
21 Abed G. T. 2003. Unfulfilled Promise, Finance&Development, A Quarterly Magazine of the IMF, 40: I 
https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/03/abed.httn 
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comparative advantage in non-oil sectors was a non-issue in many of these governments' 
economic strategies, until recently. 
For the most part, many of these oil-rich countries utilized the traditional growth 
model (Gelb, 1988; Farzi, 1993; Ascher, 1999) in that the revenue from oil and gas 
related activities was utilized in essentially three ways. First, a portion was invested in the 
domestic economy for infrastructure, consumption and production subsidies, and non-oil 
(including military and internationally non-tradable) sector development. Most of these 
activities were conducted primarily through government budget spending and with no 
real understanding and, for that matter, emphasis on creating productivity or 
competitiveness. Second, a portion of the oil and gas revenue was directly invested back 
into the country's own oil and gas sector and related petro-industries (El-Erian & Fennel, 
1997). Here, they did understand that the oil sector's development was crucial to their 
future oil revenue and with it the accompanying political power (and corruption that has 
come along with that). Finally, part of the investments was shifted into global (foreign) 
private capital market portfolios. Occasionally, the portfolios returns earned in the 
foreign capital markets ·were repatriated back home constituting an inward flow of 
investments. Other than that particular brand of inward investment flow (i.e. repatriated 
capital), the only other major type of inward investment flows these countries 
experienced over the last 30 years or so were by-and-large foreign private investment into 
the domestic oil and gas sector. In many of these countries, the inward foreign private 
capital investment flow into non-oil and gas sectors was negligible. What about the 
investments by former citizens (Diaspora), that was not a case, at least for the Persian 
Gulf region; these are mostly common among the countries of the Maghreb region.22 W 
should mention a growing demand from Muslim immigrants for Islamic bonds governed 
by Islamic laws (Sharia) that, unlike Diaspora bonds, forbid paying or receiving interest, 
and are structured as asset-backed securities of medium-term maturity that give investors 
a share of the profit associated with proceeds from such issuance. 23 
Current Literature on Economic Growth and Comparative Advantage 
Classical economists (A dam Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1817; Ramsey, I 928; Schumpeter, 
1934) provided modem theory of economic growth with the concept of diminishing 
returns, effects of techoological progress in a form of increased specialization of Iabor, 
the notion of competitive behavior, etc. The model proposed by Solow-Swan (1956) 
explained a significant part of variation of economic growth across countries. It made a 
prediction that in the absence of techoological progress, countries would inevitably face 
an economic decline, which proved to be unsustainable in the long run.Z4 To address this 
deficiency, it was assumed that the growth rate of an economy depends on the inputs of 
22 Khachani M. The Maghreb Innnigration in Europe: Its Impact on the Economy of the Countries of 
Origin. Regional Conference on Arab Migration in a Globalized World. 
htto://www.egvot.iom.int/ eLib/UploadedF older/ Abstracts%20of"/o20Research%20Papers. %20Regional%2 
OConference.pdf 
23 Ketkar, S.L., Ratha, D. 2007. Development Finance via Diaspora Bonds. Track Record and Potential. 
http:/ /siteresources. worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/3 34934-
11 00792545130/Diasporabonds.pdf 
24 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). This model specifies the levels of capital and output per worker as 
dependent upon the country's saving rate, growth rate of population, and the position of production 
function. ' 
5 
labor and capital, as well as technological progress in a form of increasing capital 
intensity, and high labor productivity. Since technological progress was treated as an 
exogenous variable, this very exogeneity did not provide answers to policy questions 
d. h . h 25 regar mg t e economic growt . 
A new class of endogenous growth models emerged to address these issues and to 
emphasize know-how, investments in R&D, entrepreneurship, development activities by 
firms and learning society as the key drivers of economic growth.26 Romer in his seminal 
work (1986) and later Lucas (1988), having adopted Arrow's learning-by-doing concept, 
underlined the role of human capital formation and increasing returns to scale. They 
showed that economic growth ·can turn into being sustainable in the long run if 
knowledge embodied in physical or human capital is treated as an endogenous variable. 
Grossman and Helpman (1990) extended the theory by fully explaining the role of 
innovation that can grow prodigiously and affect economic growth endogenously via 
technology spillovers. Dynamic models of international specialization, such as East Asia 
Growth Development Model, Porter's Diamond, Paul Krugrnan's total factor 
productivity, and Globalization theory, look more deeply into the interaction of 
technological progress, labor, and capital and propose the idea of limitless growth as a 
result of perpetual know-how advancement. 
Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth 
Numerous attempts to find a significant relationship between economic growth and 
natural resource abundance serve as an important connection between the determinants of 
economic growth and the measurement of sustainability. All else being equal, it would be 
natural to assume that resource abundance would be positively related to economic 
growth. However, there is an extensive literature in favor of the so-called "resource curse 
hypothesis" claiming that resource abundance impedes economic growth. Gelb (1988) 
confirmed such findings in his case studies with results being later reinforced in the case 
studies by Karl (1997) and Auty (1999, 2001), as well as in seminal econometric studies 
across countries by Sachs & Warner (1995, 1997, 2001), followed by Gylfason et al. 
(1999) and Busby et al. (2002). 
To outline the reasoning behind such a conclusion, van Wijnbergen (1984), Krugrnan 
(1987), Matsuyama (1992), Sachs & Warner (1995) and Gylfason et al. (1999) suggest 
that the exploitation of more natural resources "crowds out" the traded (or industrial) 
sector (so called "Dutch disease") and inhibits growth in productivity and learning effects 
(Matsen & Torvik 2002). Later studies propose the low rates of savings and investments 
to be the source of a lagged economic growth. Atkinson & Hamilton (2003) indicate a 
combination of institutional quality and resource abundance as an explanation for low 
saving and investment patterns. Gylfason et al. (2002, 2006) claim that across countries 
heavy dependence on natural resources may hurt saving and productive investment 
indirectly by slowing down the development of the financial system whereas indicators of 
financial development are strongly associated with long-run growth (Levine & Sara 
1993). 
25 UN. Analysis of Performances and Assessment of Growth and Productivity in the ESCW A Region.!: 7-8 
http://www .escwa. un.org/information/publications/edit/upload/ead-03-3-e.pdf 
26 Romer, P. M. 1994. The origins of endogenous growth. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(1 ): 3-
22. 
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New findings in the literature suggest that the natural resources may affect economic 
growth through both positive and negative channels. According to Stijns (2005), the 
typical growth regressions do not reveal the effect of natural resources on economic 
growth to the full; he believes that the ability of a country to exploit its resource base 
depends critically on the nature of the learning process involved. Papyrakis & Gerlagh 
(2004), Boschini, Pettersson & Roine (2006) and Brunnschweiler (2008) carry out studies 
along the lines of his findings. They argue that there is a positive relationship between 
natural resource abundance and economic growth when other explanatory variables, 
such as types of resources possessed by the country, institutional quality, corruption, 
investment, openness, terms of trade, and schooling, are taken into consideration. 
Countries rich in minerals are cursed only if they have low quality institutions, while the 
curse is reversed if institutions are sufficiently good. However, if former is the case, and 
resources alter the quality of institutions in a detrimental way, Mehlum, Moene & Torvik 
(2005) believe that countries suffer a double resource curse - as the deterioration of 
institutions strengthens the negative effect of more natural resources. These assumptions 
suggest that resource-abundant countries may succeed in their efforts to achieve 
sustainable development if they create appropriate high-quality institutions that would 
accumulate savings and encourage productive and efficient investments into the non-oil 
competitive tradable activities. Having said that, let us proceed with the Persian Gulf 
countries' development path. 
'DUBAI MODEL' FRAMEWORK 
The unique contribution of our paper is that we propose the Dubai Model as a framework 
to promote economic growth in the oil-exporting countries. We claim these countries 
may facilitate sustainable economic growth long after oil runs out by attracting high-
quality productive private investments into the artificially created innovation-intensive 
non-oil sectors. That will give a subsequent rise to technological spillovers and 
productivity, creating unique and dynamic comparative advantages and helping to ensure 
sustainable economic growth. Apart from transforming macroeconomic policies in a 
comprehensive manner, such a model will require these countries to introduce systemic 
changes such as liberalization, privatization and introduction of new institutions and legal 
frameworks to fully utilize those investment flows. 
The Dubai Model's essential tenant of "build it and they will come" is supported by 
the fact that Dubai government is not financing the entire economic capacity building 
with public funds (oil revenues). They are in fact acquiring significant foreign investment 
to assist in their economic expansion and thus diversify their development risk. The 
model's basic characteristics and objectives are to rapidly develop specific non-oil 
sectors and attract sustainable foreign investment. This is currently being achieved by the 
billions of dollars spent on creation of massive infrastructure and overnight development 
of industries such as tourism, financial, transportation hubs and R&D centers. This is 
done by coupling the massive scope of their physical construction with the use of name 
branding to get an instant credibility for targeted industries. Examples of such projects 
are Dubai Financial Center, Dubai Healthcare City with its extensive medical, science 
and research facilities, Maritime City, Textile, Media, Internet cities, theme parks, and 
numerous artificial islands, as a part of free trade zones with their tax incentives and 
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100% foreign ownership. The ultimate objective as stated earlier is to attract a sustainable 
inflow of private capital in the non-oil related sector- so that these sectors will continue 
to generate sustainable growth, productivity and revenue once the oil (and gas) has been 
depleted. Below is a chart with the prospects on oil and gas depletion. 
Gn1ph I. UAE Crude Oil & Lease Condensate Production Rate and v"l~'"''v11 
While constructing the framework to conceptualize this growth strategy, we have 
discovered that the "Dubai Model" serves as a framework to promote economic growth 
of only a very specific type of oil-exporting country - namely only the small countries. 
Small in terms of the size of the population is crucial to the success of this model. Small 
populations with vast oil and gas wealth allow governments to allocate capital resources 
in a more efficient, flexible, dynamic and less bureaucratic manner, while larger 
economies (with large populations have budgetary restrictions and large consumptions 
subsidies that limit their resources and flexibility. See Table 2 for and Table 3 for the 
richest countries in the region, which are small in size, as opposed to the most populated 
countries. Based on this proposition, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq would need to 
significantly modify the Dubai Model to address the needs of their large population. As 
such, we see in Saudi Arabia that although the government has employed the Dubai 
Model, it is using almost I 00 percent of its own public resources rather than drawing 
foreign capital whilst in the development stage. It hopes to attract foreign capital after the 
massive build up. A risky strategy at best and very different than that employed by the 
original "Dubai Model." 
Table 2 Middle East Overview 
Most Populated Countries in the Richest Countries in the Middle East 
Middle East GDP/capita 2007 est. 
Iran 71,021,039 Qatar $72,849 
Iraq 25,374,691 UAE $42,934 
Saudi Arabia 24,195,950 Kuwait $33,634 
Yemen 22,383,108 Israel $25,800 
8 
I Syria 19,890,585 I Bahrain $25,730 
Source: IMF and WB database 2008 
Table 3 Population of the Persian Gulf Countries 
Iran 71,021,039 UAE 4,041,000 
Iraq 25,374,691 Kuwait 2,396,417 
Saudi Arabia 24,195,950 Bahrain - 1,600,000 
Qatar -1,200,000 
Source: IMF and WB database 2008 
The problem with the Dubai Model is that they are trying to artificially create 
comparative advantage and growth (fast) ... potentially building a house of cards (with a 
very nice deck). The lessons learned in economic transformation of Central Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia from centrally planned economies to free markets structures 
demonstrate that these countries will need to implement macroeconomic policies along 
with systemic changes. The macroeconomic policies intended to curb inflation/budget 
deficit, to restore balance of payment, to raise employment rate, etc. can be done 
overnight. Again, to have these policies to sustain over a long period of time, the Persian 
Gulf and Central Asian countries will need to facilitate systemic reforms. These system 
changes will take time to build and develop core integrity. These changes include 
privatization, establishment of private property rights, development of innovative 
product-service markets, establishment of capital and labor markets, and introduction of 
new institutions and legal frameworks (good corporate governance, sound accounting 
practices, and strong rule oflaw). 
METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS OF THE 'DUBAI MODEL' 
The question we raise in our research is whether the investment and growth strategies 
employed in the Persian Gulf countries, particularly in the UAE, prove to be growth 
enhancing in the long run. Such strategies involve artificially created competitive 
advantages and use of innovative practices. Also, we explore whether those strategies 
could be applied to some other oil-exporting countries. 
In our analysis we focus on the UAE and Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia), and later we run the regression analysis for Eurasian oil 
and gas producing countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. We 
expect the Dubai Model to be growth enhancing after 1999, as this time period is known 
for reforms taking place. It follows the Asian economic crisis and signifies a significant 
rise in oil price. Upward trend in oil prices has echoed in revenues that allow 
governments of these countries to advance structural reforms and build their 
competitiveness. Here is how our hypotheses look like: 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I. The Dubai Model has created significant sustainable growth by 
generating non-oil tradable industry specific competitive advantages in Middle East 
countries that are resource rich specifically in oil & gas between 1990-2006. 
Hypothesis la. The Dubai Model has positively impacted sustainable growth in 
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Middle East oil exporting countries between 1990-2006 by attracting "high-quality" 
foreign investments in targeted non-oil tradable market sectors. 
Hypothesis lb. The Dubai Model has generated competitive advantages, which 
positively impact sustainable growth as measured by GDP per capita growth rate 
between 1990-2006. 
Hypothesis 2. The Dubai Model has generated positive significant sustainable growth 
in the Central Asian oil & gas -rich countries between 1990-2006. 
Variables of interest 
We consider the inflows of foreign direct investments into the region, revenues from oil 
and gas per capita, government expenditures on education, growth in population and 
consumption, institutional quality, and an interaction of trade openness with the foreign 
direct investments as the main factors conditioning economic growth. Below is a 
rationale for choosing these variables. 
According to the conceptual framework developed by OECD, the economic 
dimension27 of sustainable development is dependent upon three resource indicators: 
produced assets measured as a volume of net capital stock, R&D assets as a multi-factor 
productivity growth rate, and financial assets possessed by country. 28 In a case of 
resource rich countries, a country may achieve and sustain a temporarily high GDP 
without industrializing by simply over-exploiting natural resources or by misallocating 
investment. But once those resources are exhausted, this high level would no longer be 
sustainable. Therefore, we agree with Dasgupta (2007) that GDP per capita measures 
current well being rather than a sustainability of growth29 However, we are still using the 
GDP per capita growth rate (graph I) as a best available indicator for the regions of 
interest30. While considering R&D and financial as useful in measuring sustainability, we 
exclude them due to the lack of data in these two areas (the early data on fimincial assets 
is not available for most Central Asian countries). 
Graph 2. Real GDP, annual average growth rate, UAE. 
27 Measuring Sustainable Development, September 2005. Statistics Brief, OECD. 
28 Different approaches: Canada and Norway use a "capital" approach with the focus of measurement on 
the stocks and flows of different national assets: natural capital, financial capital, produced assets, human 
capital, etc. 
29 He suggests using productive base which is a combination of institutions (laws, property rights, beliefs, 
etc.) and capital assets (manufactured capital, human and natural capital, publicly available knowledge). 
30 http:! /www. un.org/esa/ sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/isdms200 I /isd-ms200 I econornicA.htm 
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Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2007. 
• 
In a most basic form, growth accounting is based on a variety of Cobb-Douglas 
production function with constant return to scale, which decomposes country's long-run 
growth rate into the weighted growth rates of capital, natural resources, labor, and overall 
ffi . 31 e JCJency : 
-A L"NfJKI-a-fJ Yt- t I l ' (1) 
One of the shortcomings of this approach is that the total factor productivity (TFP) 
variable encompasses too many public and private sector choices that might impact 
productivity growth. Krugman (1987) tries to highlight learning curve as a driving force 
behind growth productivity by saying that once established arbitrary patterns of 
specialization of countries tend to become entrenched over time; however, his model is 
extreme to the extent that it assumes dynamic scale economies to be the only source of 
specialization and comparative advantage. Since our main proposition that Dubai Model 
is FDI driven, we identify FDI as our main explanatory variable of interest. 
Growth,= a*g1. 1 + j3*FDJ, + y'*[Conditioning set],+ c:1 (2) 
Log of GDP is used to investigate the dynamic properties of the data where growth is in 
part dependent on past performance, and past input levels (Mankiw et al., 1992; Islam, 
1992; De Propris & Driffield, 2006). 
When decomposing a conditioning set, we get: 
g =constant+ a *lnGDP + fJ1 * FDI + fJ2* OILREV + /33* EDU1.n + f34*JNSTQ + 
+ f3s*P + /36*C + f37*FDI*TRADE + f3s*Dl + 7]1 + Vu, (3) 
where g denotes a sustainable growth measured as a GDP per capita, PPP (2005 
International $) growth rate. We expect the rate of per capita economic growth g to be a 
decreasing function of a lagged real per capita GDP, to control for the catch-up effect, P-
population growth, and C - final consumption expenditures. Growth rate is also an 
increasing function of the net oil revenue per capita OILREV, FDI activity - inward 
foreign direct investment stock as a percentage of GDP, and FDI*TRADE - FDI and 
openness to trade interaction term. Openness to trade is measured as exports plus imports 
relative to GDP (Carcovic & Levine, 2002). We run additional regressions to confirm the 
31 See Gylfason and Zoega (2006) 
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results using the FDI inflows per capita and FDI inflows as a percentage of Gross Capital 
Formation. We have included the lagged public expenditures on education EDU,.0 where 
available, to see whether the FDI effect is dependent on human capital. We consider it to 
be somewhat irrelevant in the case of the UAE where 80% of the workforce consists of 
immigrant workers but we have to consider it as Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998 
claim that FDI impose positive effect once a certain threshold in human development has 
being passed. Stijns (2005) also points out that the growth regression is not complete 
unless the learning process is taken into consideration. Boschini (2006) claims good 
quality institutions help to reverse resource curse, we introduce an institutional quality 
(INSTQ) that we proxy by an Index of Economic Freedom from Heritage Foundation. 
D1 is a dummy variable we use to see if the Dubai Model makes a difference in the 
period after 1999. We control regional and global economic shocks by including ry1 -fixed 
year effects; o ;, 1 is a normally distributed disturbance, i represent country and t - time 
period, respectively. 
For the Central Asian countries, where net oil revenue data was unavailable, we use 
an index, which is a combination of country's natural resource endowment in a form of 
proven reserves of oil and gas and the oil prices as they contribute up to 80% of oil-
exporting countries' GDP.32 We leave out natural gas prices as in general they follow the 
oil prices pattern with a smalllag. Plus, thirty years ago natural gas was not considered as 
an exportable commodity at all. Most countries hold concession agreements; it means 
that even if the natural gas price goes up, the involved parties still face a fixed price. We 
also had to drop institutional quality and government expenditures on education in panel 
regressions as those were only available for a short period of time and only for 
Kazakhstan. We believe that Central Asian countries initially had relatively high levels of 
education and literacy level that do not considerably vary between the countries. 
Specific effect of FDI on TFP 
To study a specific effect of FDI on TFP we also run the regressions for the Persian Gulf 
countries as Sadik & Bolbol (2001) did for select Arab countries. Besides relating growth 
in GDP ( dY N) to growth in capital I, labor L and FDI, it allows us to estimate the private 
marginal product of capital MPK: 
dYIY =A. * FDIIY +a * dLIL + MPK * 1/Y, (4) 
where A is a marginal product of TFP due to FDI spillovers. If FDI has a favorable 
effect, then A>O. 
Data 
Our sample of countries consists of the various regional groupings: Persian Gulf 
countries (Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates); and 
Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). The 
sample countries were chosen based on the list of top world oil and gas exporters and 
producers from the Energy Administration Information (Official Energy Statistics from 
32 John Page The impact of lower oil prices on the economies of Gulf states. Middle East Policy [serial 
online]. 1999;6:59-67. Available from: ProQuest Information and Learning, Ann Arbor, 
Mi. Accessed AprillO, 2008, Document ID: 43106834 
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the US Government)33 To demonstrate the impact of the Dubai Model, we have divided 
our time framework into two parts: 1990-1998, 1999-2006. 1990 - 1998 designates a 
period where no significant efforts had been made in terms of planned policies towards 
attracting inward foreign direct investments, whereas the period of 1999-2006 signifies 
the Dubai Model implementation and marks a specific policy oriented to attract inward 
FDI. We had an earlier data on the Persian Gulf countries but the sample period for the 
Central Asian countries is only 1990-2006 starting from the year of their independence. 
Therefore, to make results consistent, we had to use the same time periods even though 
they might be short to provide us with meaningful results. 
We take our data on GDP per capita, PPP, final consumption expenditures, and public 
expenditures on education from the World Bank (2007) World Development Indicators 
database; the data on FDI are taken from the Key Data of the UNCTAD (2007) World 
Investment Report; the data on exports and imports relative to GDP are taken from IMF 
World Economic Outlook database (April 2008). The net oil revenue per capita is taken 
from the EIA (Energy Information Administration) of the US Government OPEC fact 
sheet. The data on oil prices, as well as oil and gas proven reserves are taken from the 
British Petroleum Historical Data "Statistical Review Full Report Workbook 2007"34. 
The Index of Economic Freedom is taken from the Heritage Foundation past scores 
dataset. Higher scores correspond to higher level of economic freedom. Information on 
government expenditures on education was only available for Kazakhstan. The data 
sources for the GDP, investment, and population growth rate are taken from AMF, 
National Accounts of Arab Countries. 
Limitations 
As we can see from the results, growth accounting equations are limited in their power to 
explain variations in output, particularly, when combined with a missing data on certain 
countries of the Middle East and Central Asia over time. We also believe that data when 
available are plagued with severe measurement errors. 
The lack of data on corruption indices to fully account for the institutional quality 
change over long period of time (available only from 1995) contributes to the distortion 
of results for the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. Plus, Institutional Quality might be 
endogenous to the economic growth in the very long run. We may argue the institutional 
path dependence, such as Soviet heritage in case of Central Asia, and dependence on 
natural resources in case of Persian Gulf, to be the reasons for the current poor 
institutional environment. 
One of the limitations of our model is a causality issue: it might well be some other 
factors (changes in efficiency of government regulations, changes in skills of the 
workforce and so on) we don't account for, that positively influence a pace of economic 
growth in the UAE apart from the so-called Dubai Model. (We consider total inward FDI, 
which means they encompass FDI into the oil sectors as well.) The Dubai Model is size 
sensitive; we believe it to be mostly applicable to the countries with a comparable 
population size. The Saudi Arabia and Iran that, unlike Central Asian countries, have 5-
10 times fold population than the UAE, are adapting the Dubai Model with some 
33 httn://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm 
34 http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview 
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alterations focused to raise youth employment. 
To avoid the problems associated with running cross-sectional time-series analysis, 
we eliminate problems that may threaten the validity of our findings. We ensure the 
normality of error terms and that our regression estimators are unbiased by testing and 
correcting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of error terms. Also, when 
estimating dynamic models from short panel we have to remove the fixed effects. 
Because in presence of those fixed effects, the lagged dependent variable is correlated 
with the error term. We have an issue of multicollinearity due to a linear relationship 
between our explanatory variables, e.g. oil revenue and consumption. We had to drop the 
consumption variable. 
RESULTS 
Overall, our regression results support the main predictions of the Dubai Model. FDI 
inward stocks seem to have a positive effect throughout a considered period of time. 
Table 4 summarizes the findings for the UAE. 
Table 4. Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita, UAE. 
Period 1990-2006 
Intercept 40,716** 52,165* 52,247* 53,473* 63,389 605,28** 
(2,29) (4,77) (5,02) (4,85) (1,48) (14,28) 
lnGDP -0,001** -0,001* -0,001 ** -0,001 ** -0,001 ** 0,01 ** 
(-2,44) (-5,05) ( -2,90) (-2,70) (-1,82) (-14,82) 
FDI" 0,79* 0,384* 0,169 0,149 0,089 5,234** 
(4,27) (3,55) (0,79) (0,66) (0,26) (13,04) 
Oil revenue per 0,001** 0,001** 0,001** 0,001 0,001** 
capita (2,99) (3,12) (2,63) (1,32) (13,85)" 
Expenditures on -0,027 -0,028 -0,021 -0,012 
Education (-1,15) (-1,11) (-0,42) (-1,53) 
Growth in -0,312 -0,532 1,822*** 
Population (-0,61) (-0,87) (6,73) 
Growth in -0,0001 
Consumption (-0,000) 
Trade Openness -0,237 0,573** 
(-1,14) (9,07) 
Institutional -2,883*** 
quality (-1,87) 
FDI*Trade -0,192*** 
(-10,98) 
Dummy for year -0,92 -2,64** -5,01 *** -4,96*** -4,24 -10,31*** 
>~1999 (-0,47) (-2,45) (-2,17) (-2,06) (-0,98) (-11,8) 
R' adj. 0,62 0,88 0,90 0,90 0,72 0,99 
a In the regression, this variable is included as In (variable) 
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Note: t-statistics are given in brackets. 
*significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%. 
In half of the regressions, the coefficient on FDI is positive and statistically 
significant at 1 and 5 % level. We carried a series of sensitivity checks using different 
right-hand side variables such as inward FDI flows, inward FDI flows as a percentage of 
Gross Capital Formation. The estimate implies that a 1 percent-of-GDP increase in 
inward FDI stock, everything else equal, gives rise to 5,23 percent increase in the GDP 
growth rate. We must note that FDI becomes statistically insignificant once we introduce 
a control for government expenditures on education, growth in population and 
consumption, and trade openness. Such variation in investment rate can be explained by 
the short periods of increase and long periods of decrease in investment flows into 
transportation, storage and communication industries, whereas investments into the real 
estate and business services are following a strong upward trend. The coefficient on 
lagged GDP is negative and statistically significant most of the time. As anticipated, oil 
revenues boost growth but their magnitude is relatively small. It could be explained by a 
gradual deterioration of oil reserves in the UAE. Currently, oil sector does not exceed 
20% of the Dubai GDP, and oil contributes less than 5% to government revenues. 35 The 
coefficient on expenditures on education does not prove to be statistically significant, 
which is a result that we expected to see. The cost of labor dropped significantly in the 
late 80s - middle 90s; that resulted in a heightened labor use since then. As we already 
mentioned 80% of Dubai labor force is coming from abroad, therefore, it seems unlikely 
that the government was willing to invest into human capital in that period as the country 
could import the skilled workforce. It is only now that they are trying to reverse that path 
and it may take some time for newly established research institutes to bring positive 
returns. We dropped the consumption variable as we suspect a multicollinierity issue due 
to a strong correlation between oil revenues and consumption patterns. An interaction 
between FDI and trade openness enters as negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. This result does not support a notion that FDI is particularly good for the country 
with an open trade regime. It may be well that the entry and exit barriers are still pretty 
high in the UAE. It does not seem that the institutional quality has created a better 
environment for conducting business but this conclusion is somewhat dubious due to a 
lack of consistent data for the entire period of 1990-2006. 
We believe the Dubai Model to be size relevant; therefore, we run a panel regression 
using a fixed effects model for a set of countries that have relatively small population 
such as Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.36 See Table 5 for the results. Timeframe of 16 years 
might be simply too short to provide us with meaningful results on a relationship between 
the variables of interest, the impact of FDI in the short run can differ from that in the long 
run. The FDI prove to be positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The estimate 
implies that a 1 percent-of-GDP increase in inward FDI stock, everything else equal, on 
average gives rise to I ,3 percent increase in the GDP growth rate. Surprisingly, oil 
revenues per capita do not enter statistically significant for these countries. Still, the big 
share of budget revenue of these countries despite all their reforms still comes from 
35 http://www. gulfnews.com/ gngfr/ gngfr3 2008/ economy/1 023 8418 .html 
36 See Appendix 3 for population size. 
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exports of oil and natural gas and high oil price has resulted in accumulation of 
significant financial assets. We dropped institutional quality and education expenditures 
due to a lack of consistent data. The coefficients on growth in population and 
consumption mostly conform to theory but are not always statistically significant. We do 
not find robust link between growth and trade openness of the economy. The FDI and the 
interaction term between FDI and trade openness enter significantly, the coefficient on 
FDI is positive and negative on the interaction term. This may suggest that FDI may be 
growth enhancing in countries that just started opening their economies, which is 
particularly true for the Persian Gulf countries. 
Table 5. Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita. a 
Period 1990-2006 
Intercept 6,24 7,622 7,837 33,55 9,74 20,49** 
(-I, 79) (I ,57) (1,64) (1,34) (1,13) (2,61) 
lnGDP -0,0001 ** -0,0001** -0,0005* -0,0005* -0,0005* -0,0004*** 
(-2,26) (-2,66) (-3,00) (-2,78) (-3,18) (-1,86) 
FDI" 1,339* 1,299* 1,44* 1,129** 1,32* 1,603* 
(3,30) (3,22) (3,53) (2,58) (3,16) (3,49) 
Oil revenue per 0,0005 0,0005 0,0001 0,0001 -0,0001 
capita (I ,37) (1,32) (0,23) (0,28) (-0,46) 
Growth in 0,33 -0,173 -0,876 -1,977** 
Population (1,49) (-0,34) (-0,90) (-2,11) 
Growth in -0,284 
Consumption (-1,03) 
Trade openness 0,234 0,441** 
(1,28) (2,56) 
FDI*Trade -0,028*** 
(-1,86) 
Dummy for year -3,854 -5,583 -6,417*** -8,039** 7,562** -6,219** 
>~1999 (-1,20) (-1,64) (-1 ,88) (-2,23) (2,16) (-1,75) 
R' ad}. 0,24 0,27 0,31 0,307 0,34 0,39 
'Includes Kuwait, Qatar, UAE. We had to drop Bahrain due to a lack of information. 
b We do not control for education expenditures and institutional quality due to missing values for Qatar. 
Note: t-statistics are given in brackets. 
*significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 10% 
Eurasia 
The effect of FDI in Central Asian countries turns out to have a strong positive effect on 
economic growth. See table 6 for results. The estimate implies that a I percent-of-GDP 
increase in inward FDI stock, everything else equal, on average gives rise to 0,14 percent 
increase in the GDP growth rate. As expected, the lagged GDP takes a negative and 
significant value. Even though oil price plays significant role in export revenues of these 
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countries, our index does not provide us with any statistically significant results. We also 
used oil price to see if there would be any difference but got the same outcome. 
According to the estimates, a I percent-of-GDP increase in population, everything else 
equal, on average leads to 3,5 percent decline in the GDP growth rate. There has been a 
stable growth in population in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan while Kazakhstan and 
Turkrnenistan experienced a decline due to migration of some ethnic groups after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. While Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan struggle to attract 
foreign investments and are considered as more open economies, trade openness does not 
enter statistically significant, it may be explained by the relatively closed economies of 
Turkrnenistan and Uzbekistan. One may need to dissect this panel to consider these 
economies in detail. Interaction between FDI and trade openness is not significant either. 
Table 6. Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita. a 
Period I990-2006 
Intercept 8,5I3* 8,0868 IO,II* 
(3,42) (3,I3) (3,74) 
In GDP -O,OOI ** -O,OOI ** -O,OOI 
(-I,9I) (-I,94) (-I,07) 
FD1" 0,145* O,I43* O,I39* 
(3,98) (3,89) (3,90) 
Oil Price *Natural 0,002 0,004 
Abundance 0,64 (I ,45) 
Growth in -3 4I6** 
Population (-l,04) 
Growth in 
Consumption 
Trade openness 
FD1*Trade 
Dummy for year -I I,77* -II,08* -9,I5* 
>~1999 (5,3I) (-4.49) (-3,54) 
R' 0,65 0,65 0,67 
a Includes AzerbatJan, Kazakhstan, Uzbektstan, Turkmemstan 
bIn the regression, this variable is included as ln (variable) 
Note: t-statistics are given in brackets. 
*significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%. 
9,68 
(I,I8) 
-0,0009 
(-I,07) 
O,I4* 
(0,038I) 
0,004 
(I,43) 
-3,392** 
(-I,95) 
0,005 
(0,006) 
-9,I8* 
(-3,46) 
0,68 
Specific effect of FDI on TFP in select Persian Gulf countries 
9,839 
(I, I 6) 
-0,0001 
(-0,82) 
O,I4* 
(3,63) 
0,004 
(I,40) 
-3,444** 
(-I,85) 
0,003 
(0,004) 
-0,006 
(-0,08) 
-9,22* 
(-3,38) 
0,68 
8,727 
(0,87) 
-O,OOOI 
( -0,6 I) 
O,I5I* 
(3,62) 
0,004 
(I,2I) 
-3,5I8** 
(-I,80) 
O,OI9 
(O,I8) 
-0,035 
(-0,33) 
O,OOI 
(0,92) 
-9,46* 
(-3,35) 
0,68 
To see whether FDI play a positive role in total factor productivity, we also run the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) for 1996-2006 for five Persian Gulf countries: Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. 
Table 7. Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP. 
1/GDP FDIIGDP dLIL R' adj. 
Bahrain 0,035** (2,95) 2,I2 *** (2,44) I I,05 (0,77) 0,53 
Kuwait 0,005 (0,99) -3,27 (-0,09) -0,342 (-0,07) 0,2I 
Qatar O,OOOOI (0,05) 5,I94* (2,I8) -9,467* (-2,0I) 0,36 
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Saudi Arabia -2,83** (-2,75) -27,92* (-3,55) 0,72 
UAE 0,0001 (0,40 0,42 (0,35) -0,974 (-0,76) 0,11 
Note: t-statistics are given in brackets. 
In our results we confirm a conclusion that there is no universal way for FDI to affect 
economic growth. There are so many specific firm level and country level situations 
where FDI would be different depending on a set of policies and factors in place. We get 
the conflicting predictions on the growth effects of FDI in the Persian Gulf countries. 
Receipts from oil exports and skyrocketing oil price allow these countries to invest 
heavily domestically. Bahrain, a regional financial hub, demonstrates strong positive 
spillovers from FDI and domestic investments onto TFP. Rising oil prices add to 
financial sector that can have a higher liquidity. It allows low interest rates to boost 
private consumption. Also, Bahrain is one of the Persian Gulf economies that extract a 
large share of its exports from the processed petroleum products and utilizes its strong 
transportation and communication infrastructure to attract foreign businesses to import 
duty free. But with a steady decline in its oil reserves, it gets highly dependent on crude 
oil imports. FDI in Qatar, with its large investments into the human capital, education and 
health care system, and LNG (liquefied natural gas) industry seem to have a favorable 
effect on TFP. The mounting demand from growing population (due to influx of foreign 
workers) for inputs has to be satisfied from abroad. We confirm the findings ofBolbol & 
Sadik for Saudi Arabia, whose 'A is negative and statistically significant. They claim that 
it could be linked to the fact that most FD I (except some in light manufacturing and 
consumer goods) are tied to the Saudi Offset Program. According to it, foreign defense 
contractors have to reinvest part of their earnings back into the country. Speaking of the 
Persian Gulf, we agree with M. Porter that most of the policies in the region are designed 
centrally and imposed by the government, including FDI policies. The investment 
behavior can be characterized as a one focused on infrastructure building rather than 
productivity growth. But at the same time, this ability to invest into the high cost world-
class facilities, hub for airlines, top of the market resorts, etc. may help the Persian Gulf 
countries to gain competitive advantage that other countries in the region may not afford. 
The lack of substantial spillover effects on TFP for Kuwait and UAE could be 
explained by some external factors that swallow the growth effects of domestic and 
foreign capital, as well as labor. In case of Kuwait, that has extensive non-oil income 
coming from foreign assets, such factors may include political constraints in liberalizing 
tax regime for non-oil foreign companies, as well as unwillingness of the government to 
introduce quality reforms to develop competitive advantages by attracting FDI into non 
oil sectors. In fact, UAE and Kuwait are among the highest real non-oil GDP between 
1998-2006 (IMF, Regional Economic Outlook 2007). We believe the invigorating 
reforms taking place in the UAE will need their time to unfold. 
A significant growth effect of labor in Saudi Arabia can be explained by the huge 
number of young people of working age in its 5-times increased population. Iran and 
Saudi Arabia will need to adapt the Dubai Model with certain modifications intended not 
only to improve the infrastructure but also to employ its labor force. 
The entire process of attracting FDI into Central Asian countries has taken a 
contradictory character starting their independence. Most of the enterprises in early 1990s 
and later on have been sold and resold at very cheap prices. Consider Kazakhstan, where 
bribery, corruption and the lack of transparency in FDI negotiations provided base for 
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what Peck (2004) called as "a sale of a century". Most of those FDI went into the oil and 
metal sectors that were falling short in infrastructure. Should those investments taken 
time to develop investment environment in a more planned manner, the economic 
outcomes could have been a way better for Central Asian countries. The process was 
plagued with many conflicts, allegations in corruption, and subsequent renegotiations in 
many cases. Some governments are trying to reverse the dire consequences by 
introducing new reforms. For example, Kazakhstan has been able to identifY seven pilot 
clusters in services and machinery for oil and gas, construction, metallurgical sector, 
textiles, tourism, transshipment and logistics, etc. to broaden its industrial base. It has 
also created three-tier institutions to invest millions of dollars from oil revenues to 
projects intended to create a necessary innovation infrastructure, dedicated think-tanks 
and policy analysis institutions The purpose is to attract foreign investors to those 
targeted clusters to develop high-tech enterprises on a sustainable basis. In a same way 
the UAE and other Persian Gulf countries did, Central Asian countries have created Free 
Trade Zones to make a use of duty free imports, and other incentives to investors in 
relevant areas. Special agencies have been created to furnish the potential investors with 
information and assist them.37 The focus is to employ the investments into the 
innovation-driven industries. A potential research could be made on the operation of each 
particular cluster such as tourism, transportation hub, its interaction with other clusters, 
and their effect on the overall economy. Some authors provide a complimentary analysis 
on financial centers existing in the Persian Gulf, same could be done on Central Asian 
countries; as they have been created pretty recently and it is hard to judge their 
performance due to a limited activity. 
CONCLUSION 
The Persian Gulf countries are trying to artificially create comparative advantage and 
growth very fast. The potential outcome can simply become a house of cards (with a very 
nice deck, though). In their efforts to fill in this house with knowledge and R&D and 
create credibility overnight, they attract brand names such as Harvard, Princeton, etc. We 
don't know if such artificially created knowledge and economic cities will provide 
artificial growth and if yes, how sustainable this growth is going to be. It may take more 
time to see a rise in the marginal rate of return on those investments into this massive 
build up. Persian Gulf countries may probably learn from Central Asian experience, 
particularly from Kazakhstan that has haphazardly tried to attract too many investors in 
too many sectors, too rapidly and all at the same time in what is now called "sale of a 
century". Certain elements of economic development require time to build i.e. systemic 
integrity. The lessons learned in economic transformation of Central Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia from centrally planned economies to free markets structures demonstrate 
that these countries will need to implement macroeconomic policies along with systemic 
changes. The macroeconomic policies intended to curb inflation/budget deficit, to restore 
balance of payment, to raise employment rate, etc. and construction of infrastructure can 
be done overnight. However, to have these policies to sustain over a long period of time, 
the Persian Gulf and Central Asian countries will need to facilitate systemic reforms. 
37 See www.kazyna.kz 
19 
These system changes will take time to build and develop core integrity. These changes 
include privatization, establishment of private property rights, development of innovative 
product-service markets, establishment of capital and labor markets, and introduction of 
new institutions and legal frameworks (good corporate governance, sound accounting 
practices, and strong rule oflaw). As long as those changes are not in place, prospects for 
growth, and what's more important, sustainable development, remain to be uncertain. 
Appendices 
I. The King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) was launched in 2005 in Rabegh (Red Sea 
Coast). Three integrated economic cities were launched in 2006 (the Prince Abdul Aziz 
bin Mousaed Economic City in Hail, the Knowledge Economic City (KEC) in Medina, 
and the Jazen Economic City in Jazan). The four cities are expected to attract investments 
worth more than SR300bn (US$80bn) and create more than a million jobs within the next 
10 to 20 years. In 2007, plans were released to establish two more economic cities, one in 
Tabuk and one in the Kingdom's Eastern Region. 
2. The Kaaba is a cuboidal building located inside the al-Masjid al-Haram mosque in 
Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The mosque was built around the original Kaaba. The Kaaba is the 
holiest place in Islam. The gibla, the direction Muslims face during prayer, is the 
direction from their location on Earth towards the Kaaba. It is around the Kaaba that 
ritual circumambulation is performed by Muslims during the Hajj (pilgrimage) season as 
well as during the Umrah (lesser pilgrimage). 
3. Population size. 
Large: Saudi Arabia= 27,019,73 I, Iran= 67,752,020, Iraq= 24,699,000 
Small: United Arab Emirates= 4,041,000, Kuwait= 2,396,417, Qatar = -1,000,000, 
Bahrain=-1,600,000. 
Definitions 
Sustainability is an achievement of a policy to invest the rents from resource depletion in 
alternative forms of wealth, which ensures that, in the aggregate, the change in the real 
value of assets is positive (Hartwick, 1977; Solow, 1986). 
We define competitive advantage as an ability of a country to attract foreign investments 
into the region and benefit from utilizing local comparative advantages, such as religion, 
ports, etc. 
FDI denotes investments involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting 
interest and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent 
enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct 
investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). FDI flows comprise 
capital provided by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise, or capital received from 
an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor. FDI stock is the value of the share of their 
capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise, plus 
20 
the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise.38 "High-quality" foreign 
investments constitute investments into the non-oil internationally tradable sectors with a 
purpose to increase manufactured exports. FDI into the real estate, and hotels, etc. 
represent FDI into the internationally non-tradable activities as this type of investment is 
less likely to bring in new technology or help local companies to integrate into global 
supply networks.39 Despite that, for a country at the investment-driven stage, an extensive 
joint venturing and heavy investment in trade-related infrastructure (roads, 
telecommunications and ports) is highly present.40 
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